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School Choice and the Establishment
Clause: Theories of "Constitutional Legal
Cause"
Richard C. Mason*
I.

Introduction

The publication of Politics, Markets, and America's Schools,'
by John E. Chubb and Terry Moe, 2 evidences the broadening national support for academic restructuring in the form of "School
Choice." In recent years twelve states have passed laws granting parents greater discretion to choose which schools their children will
attend.3
"School Choice" is a catch-phrase for an educational theory
based on the premise that, if public schools are forced to compete for
students, they will become more responsive to parents and shed
much of their bureaucratic infrastructure." Furthermore, it is posited
that competition between schools will foster a wider variety of teaching methods, initiated not by top-down management, but by the need
to attract students in order to survive. 6 Chubb and Moe envision government grants to schools based strictly on the number of students
the schools attract.' They offer a plan in which any group meeting
state criteria must be permitted to accept both students and public
money.7 The proposed criteria would result in the inclusion of most
private schools, perhaps even private religious ("sectarian") schools,
if sectarian schools would help to increase the total number of effective schools.8
* Associate, Palmer, Biezup & Henderson, Philadelphia, PA; J.D., University of Maryland School of Law.
I. JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY MOE. POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICAN SCHOOLS
(1990).
2. Chubb is a senior fellow in the Governmental Studies program at the Brookings Institute. Moe, formerly a senior fellow at Brookings, is a professor of political science at Stanford
University.
3. Karen De Witt, Debate on School Choice Continues, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1990, at
88.
4. See generally CHUBB & MOE, supra note I, at 26-66.
5. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 1, at 27.
6. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 1, at 219.
7. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 1, at 219.
8. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 1, at 219.
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Allocating government funds to sectarian schools raises the
question of whether a School Choice plan that included sectarian
schools would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.9 Opponents of a School Choice bill in Pennsylvania argued
that the bill would violate the First Amendment by "funnelling
money to religiously affiliated schools." 10 On one hand, providing
government funds to sectarian schools might appear to dictate summary invalidation of a School Choice plan. However, the fact that
the government funds find their way to sectarian schools by individuals' choices and not by order of the state suggests otherwise.
The Supreme Court has never decided a case directly on point.
In similar cases, the Court has considered such factors as (1) the
"substantiality" of the aid to sectarian schools;1" (2) the "directness"
of the route taken by the aid; 2 and (3) whether the law as a whole
gives the appearance that the state is "endorsing" support for religion. 13 This Article argues that the foregoing factors are merely
components of a much broader analysis. In actuality, the Court has
attempted to decide whether a particular state should be considered
"responsible" for a law that has an indirect, but inevitable, religious
"effect." One might accurately phrase the issue in these cases as
whether the law has "legally caused" the religious effect.
"Legal cause" is a product of the doctrinal policies of the field
of law in which it is used. In American constitutional law, those policies are found in the Bill of Rights, the Establishment Clause, and
the relation of the state to its citizenry. This Article first sets forth
the Court's test for constitutionality under the Establishment Clause
and then analyzes the "legal cause" doctrines implicit in the Court's
decisions. The Article argues that a refinement of these doctrines is
required before the Court can conduct a principled analysis of the
constitutionality of School Choice. The reader is forewarned that the
issues raised by a School Choice plan incorporating sectarian schools
cannot be resolved by a facile appraisal; cases arising under the Establishment Clause "have presented some of the most perplexing
9. The Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion ....
" U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 2, cl. I. The Establishment Clause
applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 117 (1924).
10. Dale Mezzarappa, Sides Air Views on School Choice, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 30,
1991, at 5B.
11. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 483 (1986).
12. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983).
13. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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questions" to come before the Court.
II.

4

The Lemon Test: "Respecting an Establishment of Religion"

In 1971, the United States Supreme Court announced a test engineered to help courts judge whether a particular law was one "respecting an establishment of religion." 15 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 6

the Court held that the Establishment Clause requires that neither
the federal government nor any state may enact a law that:
1. Has a religious purpose;
2. Will unduly entangle the government with religion; or
3. Has 7a primary effect that either advances or inhibits
religion.1
The "Lemon test" is based on a broad reading of the Establishment
Clause. The Court did not attempt to define what an "establishment" of religion is, but rather fashioned a device for identifying
laws tending to launch states down the slippery slope toward an establishment of religion. If School Choice is valid under Lemon, it
would likely be found valid under a narrower reading of the Establishment Clause.
A.

The First Prong: A Religious Purpose

The "purpose" prong of Lemon may be thought of as the
"threshold" requirement for a law subject to scrutiny under the
Lemon test. This prong has its origin in the Court's interpretation of
the Establishment Clause as erecting a "wall of separation" between
the church and the state such that no government may enact laws
intended to "aid religion." 18 Nonetheless, this wall need not partition
14. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760
(1973).
15. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The test appears to have been designed
to ferret out laws respecting "religion." See infra notes 16-49.
16. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
17. Id. at 612-13.
18. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,16 (1947). This interpretation appears to be
based upon a misreading of constitutional history. The "wall" theory enunciated in Everson
was drawn from a letter written by Thomas Jefferson eight years after the Bill of Rights was
adopted. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Jefferson
was in Paris during the floor debates concerning the drafting of the First Amendment. However, James Madison was in attendance and became the chief architect of the First Amendment. Madison's first draft of the Establishment Clause provided that no "national religion
should be established." Id. at 94 (citing I ANNALS OF CONG. 434). This and similar versions
were rejected because of the collateral debate over whether a nation or a republic was being
founded. Id. at 96-97. Although the records of the floor debate concerning the Establishment
Clause reveal considerable argument over whether the First Amendment could successfully
preclude the possibility of a national church or the preference of one religion over another,
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the minds and wills of the legislature and preclude: any hint of sectarian concern. The Court has not interpreted the first prong of Lemon

to require that a statute have an exclusively secular objective.19 If a
rational, substantial, secular purpose can be proffered, the Court will
hold that the law is valid under the "purpose" prong of Lemon.20
For a state to justify a School Choice plan on secular grounds,
the plan need only allege that its purpose is to improve the quality of
secular education in the state. The concepts underlying School
Choice undoubtedly comprise a secular legislative purpose. For example, the Court has held that "[a] state's decision to defray the
cost of educational expenses incurred by parents . . . evidences a

purpose that is both secular and understandable," even if the plan
benefits children attending sectarian schools, because '[a]n educated
populace is essential to the political and economic health of any community .
,,.I
Indeed, the Court has not once rejected a funding
measure involving sectarian schools by concluding that a state intended to advance religion.2 2 In the likely event that the Court finds
that a School Choice Plan has a secular purpose, the Court would
next examine the plan under the entanglement prong of Lemon.
there is no record of any delegate advancing the connotation that the Establishment Clause in
Everson precluded all government involvement with religion. Id.
Supreme Court Justice and constitutional historian Joseph Story (1779-1845) wrote that
"an attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter
indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal indignation. The
real object [was] to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects." Id. at 55. Thus, it is unsurprising that Jefferson himself authorized religious sects to "establish within, or adjacent to, the
precincts of [the University of Virginia] schools for instruction in the religion of their sect."
See Illinois ex rel. McCullom v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 246 (1948) (Reed, J.,
dissenting). Nor is it surprising that until 1897 Congress regularly appointed public money to provide
Roman Catholic education to Native Americans. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 103-04. The Blaine
Amendment, proposed in 1876, would have read in part that "no state shall make any law
respecting an establishment of religion . . . .[N]o public revenue . . .shall be appropriated
to, or made or used for the support of any school, educational or any other institution, under
the control of any religious or anti-religious sect.
...
McCullom, 333 U.S. at 220. It is
difficult to understand why Congress would propose such legislation if the Establishment
Clause, as written, prohibited governmental support for religion.
If, as it appears, the Court has misinterpreted the Establishment Clause, the significance
is twofold with regard to this Article: (1)the Court may ultimately reverse Everson and its
progeny, which would almost certainly validate School Choice plans; and (2) because this Article is more of an analysis of the Court's decisions than a critique, the analysis grants the
Establishment Clause the broad interpretation found in Everson and Lemon.
19. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 n.6 (1984).
20. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). In Lemon, the Court noted with
approval that the statutes themselves expressly stated that they were intended to enhance the
quality of the secular education in all schools. Id. at 612.
21. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 395 (1983).
22. See John E. Nowak, The Supreme Court, The Religion Clauses, and the Nationalization of Education, 70 N.W.U. L. REv. 884 (1976).
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B.

The Second Prong.-Entanglement

Undue state entanglement with religion poses two problems: (1)
active government involvement in the carrying on of religious activities "erodes respect for government while degrading religion; 12 3 and
(2) state-sponsored religious initiatives may tend to create political
division along religious lines, contrary to the intent of the Framers.2"
The test is "one of degree,"2 5 and, therefore, the government may
provide buses26 or lend books2 7 to private schools, notwithstanding
the fact that government officials must interact with religious school
leaders.
School Choice plans do not contemplate government participation in the running of sectarian schools.28 Nonetheless, School
Choice could potentially foster political division along religious lines.
For example, such division could occur if it were discovered that
Catholic schools were redeeming more vouchers than Presbyterian
schools. In addition, other individuals may generally object to all
such funding and may find themselves opposed by many or all organized religions acting in concert. However, these prospects should not
void School Choice plans under the entanglement prong of Lemon
for two reasons: (1) although plans will benefit some religious institutions more than others, they will tend to create minority religion
education opportunities that have not previously existed;2 9 and (2)
the Court has not consistently used the political divisiveness rationale to invalidate legislation.
A School Choice plan would diminish government entanglement
with religion by removing the motivation for ceaseless state attempts
to aid sectarian schools through free busing, 30 textbook loans,31
"shared time" programs,32 tuition grants, 33 and state efforts to introduce prayer and Bible readings into public schools. 4 A School
23. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (holding that New York's program of
daily classroom invocation of God's blessings unduly entangled the government with religion).

24. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
25. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
26. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
27. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
28. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 1, at 215-25.
29. Accordingly, political division over the amounts to be appropriated would "be along
lines other than religion." Note, Voucher Systems of Public Education after Nyquist and
Sloan: Can a Constitutional System be Devised?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 895, 908 (1974) [hereinafter Voucher Systems].
30. Everson, 330 U.S. 1.
31. Meek, 421 U.S. 349.
32. See Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
33. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
34. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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Choice program would tend to satiate those who hunger for religious
observance during school. School Choice would also redefine the secular school demography such that there would be very little support
in these schools for religious indoctrination. By obviating the need
for school prayer bills and like measures, School Choice might actually result in the country becoming less divisive.
The reasons for the Court's reluctance to use the political divisiveness rationale to invalidate legislation become clear upon reflection. Imagine what would occur if a state senator proposed an official
proclamation, which read: "It is the government's belief that the
New Testament has been fabricated from whole cloth and could not
possibly have been written by ignorant fisherman." The conceivable
political uproar following such a proclamation would be akin to religious conflict, but the proclamation would not unduly entangle the
government with religion. 35 There is simply no rational relation between "divisiveness" and "entanglement."
This lack of relation became apparent in Wal, v. Tax Commission,a6 in which the Court approved tax-exempt status for religious
37
institutions despite strong opposition from secularist organizations.
The Court approved the law because "[e]limination of [the] exemption would tend to expand the involvement of government [with religion]." 38 If, as in Walz, a law can engender religious divisiveness,
yet lessen government entanglement, the divisiveness rationale is
nothing more than an obscurant gloss.
A state may successfully offer a secular purpose for a School
Choice plan. The plan also may be defended as minimizing, rather
than increasing, state entanglement with religion. Accordingly,
School Choice will stand or fall under the "effects" prong of the
Lemon test.
C. The Third Prong.-A Primary Effect That Advances or Inhibits
Religion
The principle that a law violates the Establishment Clause if it
has a primary effect that either advances or inhibits religion bears a
35. Such a proclamation might well be void under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.
36. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
37. Anicus briefs opposing the exemption were filed by the ACLU and the Society of
Separationists, Inc. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 666 (1970). Briefs supporting the
exemption were fi!ed by the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States,
the Episcopal Diocese of New York, the Synagogue Council of America, and the Baptist Joint
Committee on Public Affairs. Id.
38. Id. at 674 (emphasis added).

SCHOOL CHOICE

close resemblance to civil rights jurisprudence.8 9 In civil rights cases,
the Court has occasionally rejected the distinction between de jure
and de facto invidious discrimination. For example, a California ordinance outlawing the operation of a laundry not located in a brick
or stone building was found to be unconstitutional as enforced
against Chinese nationals who comprised almost all of the class of
individuals affected by the law."0 In Establishment Clause cases, the
Court has invalidated laws that do not mention religion if in fact the
law primarily advances religion.41

Not all laws that aid religion are found unconstitutional under
this formulation. The Court has qualified the effects prong by upholding laws having a "primary secular purpose" even if they also

advance religion. The Court has permitted states to loan books to
sectarian schools4" and to provide free busing despite the fact that
these goods and services may defray the schools' costs and may even
make it more likely that some children would obtain a religious education than would otherwise be the case.4 In short, the government
may legitimately "accommodate" religion, particularly in cases
where to do otherwise might interfere with the free exercise of
religion.44
The doctrine of accommodation permits firemen to save

churches, rather than stand idly by in fear of bridging the separation
between church and state. "5 A contrary policy would establish the
state as an adversary of religious institutions because the state's denial of basic civil protection would place an extra burden on religious
institutions.4 6 Having breached the wall of separation between
39. The effects prong's pedigree under the Establishment Clause cases may be traced to
Everson, see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961), but its meaning was less
certain before the decision in Lemon. In Walz, for example, the Court held that tax-exempt
status for religious establishments had a secular purpose. The Court then cautioned, "We must
• . .be sure that the end result-the effect-is not an excessive government entanglement with
religion." Walz, 397 U.S. at 674.
40. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
41. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
760 (1973). Although the defacto principal makes good sense in the abstract, the same cannot
easily be said for reflexively applying it in Establishment Clause cases. There is little doubt
that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment found the very existence of invidious discrimination unacceptable. It is therefore reasonable to invalidate laws that might, even unintentionally, tend to promote discrimination. By contrast, it is not reasonable to assume that the framers of the Establishment Clause objected to the existence or growth of religion.
42. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 244 (1968).
43. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); cf. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 772
(citing Everson, but cautioning that the Establishment Clause "prescribes sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity").
44. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 240 (1972).
45. Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.
46. See id. The Court has commented that if the Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
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church and state, however, the accommodation doctrine opened the
way for uncontrolled expansion. One court has gone so far as to hold
that sectarian schools may participate with public schools in sharedtime instructions and auxiliary services because denial would inhibit
the free exercise of religion. 7 One commentator has inferred that
the doctrine validates even preferential treatment to religious interests if this treatment will promote religious liberty, as in the case
where a state grants churches tax-exempt status. 8
Recognizing that the accommodation doctrine: opens the door to
state policies that benefit religion, the Court has attempted to find a
principle or principles by which it may distinguish between accommodation and aid. Two principles that bear on the validity of School
Choice are (1) the substantiality; and (2) the directness of a prospective benefit to sectarian schools. 9
III.
Aid

Substantiality: Distinguishing Between. Accommodation and

Laws conferring insubstantial aid to sectarian schools do not
normally offend the Establishment Clause. The "mere possibility"
that a law permitting sectarian schools to borrow textbooks might
subsidize sectarian schools will not invalidate such a program, 0 but
the furnishing of more expensive educational items, such as film projectors, will make the Court blanche. 5 When the Court analyzes aid
in terms of degree, sectarian schools are considered to be particularly
suspect. In sectarian schools, "secular and religious education are so
inextricably intertwined, that substantial aid to the sectarian school
enterprise as a whole . . . amounts to a forbidden establishment of
religion." 5 2 Accordingly, Justice Marshall once recommended that
the Court calculate the expected cost of the aid: "The First Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded attempts to
avoid its prohibitions, and, in any event, ingenuity of draftsmanship
cannot obscure the fact that this subsidy to sectarian schools
ment were taken to their logical extremes, they would encroach upon one another. Cf Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 360 (1975). Of course, this proposition is true only if the Establishment Clause is interpreted as prohibiting support for religion in general, rather than the establishment of a national religion. If the latter interpretation is given, firemen do not need the
accommodation doctrine in order to save churches.
47. In Re Proposal C, 185 N.W.2d 9, 17-22 (Mich. 1971).
48. Voucher Systems, supra note 26, at 898 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970)).
49. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 742-48 (1973).
50. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 364 (1975).
51. See id.
52. Id. at 366.
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amounts to $88,000,000 just for the initial biennium. ' ' 53
Following this, reasoning, insubstantiality may operate to validate a law. Writing for a unanimous court in Witters v. Washington
Department of Services for the Blind,54 Justice Marshall approved a
tuition grant to a student even though the student applied the grant
to a seminarial school for training to become a priest.5 5 Justice Marshall relied upon the fact that the plaintiff was the only student on
record who had sought to apply a grant in a religious context.5 6
Nothing in the aid program indicated that a significant proportion of
the program's funding would flow to sectarian schools. 7 Thus, the
program did not have the effect of establishing religion. 8
Given the Court's reading of the Establishment Clause as establishing a wall of separation between church and state, the substantiality doctrine has a fair degree of utility. Weighing the amount of
aid provided may enable the Court to distinguish between a law that
"accommodates" religion and one that promotes an "establishment
of religion."
Whether the substantiality of the religious effect alone should
operate to invalidate a law that has a primary secular effect is a
matter of some controversy. The effects test set forth in Lemon is
derived from and incorporates the precise language used in Everson,
in which the Court held that no law may have the primary effect of
advancing or inhibiting religion. Nevertheless, the Court in Nyquist
held that "a primary secular effect cannot serve . . . to justify . . . a
direct and substantial advancement of religion." 5 9 Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority in Mueller v. Allen,6 0 adhered to the literal
meaning of primary effect, concluding that even a plan having a substantial, but secondary, religious effect may be constitutional. 61 According to Mueller, the substantiality of a religious effect is probative, but not necessarily determinative. In dissent, Justice Marshall
countered that, "Even if one primary effect is to promote some legitimate end under the State's police power, the legislation is not immune from further examination to ascertain whether it also has the
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
(1973).
60.
61.

Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 256 (1977).
474 U.S. 481 (1986).
Id. at 482.
Id. at 483.
Id.
Id.
Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783
463 U.S. 388 (1983).
Id. at 397.
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direct and immediate effect of advancing religion." 2
Technically a law cannot have two primary effects. Only one

effect may be primary, while others, even if substantial, must be secondary. Nonetheless, the fairness of discarding a doctrine potentially
grounded in the intrinsic meaning of the Establishment Clause because it is technically at odds with the specific language of Everson
must be questioned. 63 Indeed, Rehnquist's opinion in Mueller could

be interpreted as making a mischievous distinction were it not for
the particular philosophy of constitutional interpretation underlying
Lemon's "effects" prong. In applying the "effects"' prong, the court
has accorded precedent more importance than history. 4
The Court has demanded that the states adhere to the letter of
Everson, and it therefore would be disingenuous for the Court to
look beyond Everson when the holding, validating a law with a primary secular effect, proves inconvenient. Thus, Mueller is consistent
with Everson; the Court approved the law because the religious effect, being indirect, was secondary. 5
The twin considerations of "substantiality" and "directness"
arise in almost every decision in which public money has reached

sectarian schools. This happens because the Court has not been engaged simply in determining whether a religious effect has in fact
happened, but instead has been faced with the more demanding task
of deciding if a religious effect may reasonably be attributed to the

law. In summary, should it make a difference if aid flows to religious
schools not by the direction of the state, but thr:ough the personal
choices of individual parents?
62.

Id. at 406 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

63. But see Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 679 (1970) ("The argument that making 'fine distinctions' between what is and is not absolute under the Constitution is to render us
a nation of men, not laws, gives too little weight to the fact that it is an essential part of
adjudication to draw distinctions, including fine ones, in the process of interpreting the
Constitution.").
64. Perhaps the clearest example of the Court's interpretive philosophy is found in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985), in which a state proffered what it called "newly discovered
historical evidence" in support of a law authorizing a moment of silence in public schools. Id.
at 45. The Court bluntly informed the state that the issue of whether the Framers had intended only to prevent favoritism between religions had been settled to the contrary in Everson
and that the state's re-examination of that issue was a "remarkable" breach of judiciousness.
Id. at 48. Justice Rehnquist wrote a 35 page dissent, relying heavily on historical evidence.
The majority ignored both the dissent and the new evidence.
65. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 398 (1983) ("[Al program [consisting of tax deductions] that neutrally provides state assistance to a broad spectrum of citizens is not readily
subject to a challenge under the Establishment Clause.").

SCHOOL CHOICE

IV.

Constitutional Legal Cause and Directness

The issue of directness frequently arises in effects prong analyses because no person suffers deprivation of a constitutional right unless a state causes tax dollars to flow to a religious institution. Although a state law may ultimately cause a religious effect, it does
not necessarily follow that the particular state law violates the Establishment Clause.
For example, the Court in Witters v. Washington Department
of Services for the Blind confronted the case of a young man who
had spent his government grant on tuition for priestly instruction.6 6
The Witters program funds applicants through vocational rehabilitation vouchers that enable students to attend the institution of their
choice. However, the nature of the program limits applicants'
choices to education in the "professions, businesses or trades."6 8
Thus, even though a student may freely choose a religious school,
such a choice is unlikely.
Accordingly, Justice Marshall praised the Witters plan for giving aid recipients "full opportunity to expend [their vouchers] on
wholly secular education" rather than on religious training.6 9 The
program for the blind created no financial incentive for students to
pursue religious education, nor did it provide greater benefits to students who made this choice."0 The plan's neutrality in design and
effect counted strongly in its favor.7
In contrast, the Court in Mueller v. Allen approved a Pennsylvania law authorizing substantial tax deductions for parents of students attending private schools because the distribution of the economic benefits under the law was subject to private, individual
choices. The Court reached this result despite the fact that of the
90,000 students enrolled in nonpublic schools charging tuition, over
95 % attended sectarian schools.7 ' The Court would likely have condemned the plan had the aid not reached the schools exclusively as a
"result of the choices of individual parents."7 3
When the Court undertakes this latter kind of analysis, it is not
unduly concerned with the substantiality of religious effect. Rather,
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
Id. at 483.
Id.
Id. at 484.
Id.
Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 484 (1986).
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 405 (1983).
Id. at 399.
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the issue that the Court decides by means of the directness criteria
might be more constructively identified as one of "legal causation."
The question is whether the law has legally caused the religious effect complained of such that it constitutes a law respecting an establishment of religion. For example, a School Choice law might accurately be described as "causing" religious institutions to benefit, in
the most absolute sense, but that does not necessarily indicate that
the law is one respecting religion:
[T]he Establishment Clause is not violated every time money
previously in the possession of the state is conveyed to a religious
institution. For example, a state may issue a paycheck to one of
its employees who may then donate all or part of the paycheck
to a religious institution, all without constitutional barrier; and
the State may do so even knowing that the employee so intends
to dispose of his salary." '
Therefore, cause in fact results in an insufficient connection between
law and religious effect.
Nevertheless, the substantiality doctrine may admit that cause
in fact is insufficiently probative, yet find a connection between the
law and the effect if the law's probable effect would be to substantially aid religion. As expressed by the dissenters in Mueller,7" a
state acts to advance religion when the inevitable effect of a law will
be to advance religion. 76 "History and experience likewise instruct us
that any generally available financial assistance for elementary and
secondary school tuition expenses mainly will further religious education because the majority of the schools which charge tuition are
sectarian."" By contrast, when the program's prospective religious
impact will foreseeably be insubstantial, "the link between the State
and the school . . is a highly attenuated one."' 78 The Court will not
hold the state responsible under the "substantiality" doctrine if the
state's act is unlikely to cause the impermissible effect.
The foregoing reasoning bears a close resemblance to common
law causation theory. In tort law, an actor may be held responsible
for an injury caused by a third party if the actor's initial deed
foreseeably permitted the third party to cause the injury. 79 In crimi74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
(shopper

Witters, 474 U.S. at 482-83.
Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackman, and Stevens.
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 408.
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 411 (1983).
Witters v. Washington Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
See, e.g., Passavoy v. Nordstrom, Inc., 758 P.2d 524, 529 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988)
injured by fleeing shoplifter recovered from storeowner based on the owner's failure
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nal law, an aider or abettor may be held responsible for the acts of
an accomplice unless those acts were clearly unforeseeable."0
If the substantiality doctrine is a child of common law causation
theory, it is natural to inquire whether there is anything that should
distinguish legal cause, as it exists at common law, from a constitutional doctrine of cause and effect. In criminal law, liability predicated on legal cause is determined as a matter of policies germane to
the field of criminal justice."' In the field of torts, legal causation
"rests on policy decisions as to how far the consequences of a defend'
ant's acts should extend." 82
The doctrine "rests on common sense,
' '8 3
rather than legal formula,
and responsibility for one's acts should
be allocated in accordance with "the general goals of tort law: morality, justice, fairness, and compensation to victims. '84 The cases
establish that "legal cause" is a creation of doctrinal policies or rationales that, predictably, diverge from what may be considered constitutional rationales. In applying the Lemon effects test, the Court
should be unconcerned with allocating compensation or assessing
morality. Instead, the Court attempts to discern if a nexus may be
found between the law and the religious effect that justifies holding
the state responsible for the religious effect of its policies.
What constitutional rationale should underlie a legal cause determination on School Choice? A few Establishment Clause cases
have stated conclusory "goals," such as an intent to preclude "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in
religious activity." 8 These are of little probative value, especially
since the Court has approved each of these "evils" in one form or
to give adequate warning).
80. See, e.g., People v. Brigham, 265 Cal. Rptr. 486, 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) ("The
law's policy is simply to extend criminal liability to one who knowingly and intentionally encourages, assists, or influences the criminal act of another, if the latter's crime is naturally and
probably caused by the criminal act so encouraged, assisted or influenced.").
81. See id.
82. Passavoy, 758 P.2d at 529.
83. Schwarz v. Hathaway, 570 A.2d 348, 351 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990). In Schwarz,
the court considered whether a plaintiff's contributory negligence-pushing a motorcycle along
the side of a road-should bar the plaintiff's claim against a driver who ran into the plaintiff.
The court held that the plaintiff's negligence did not bar recovery because it was merely "passive and potential." Id. at 352. A government that provided funding through a School Choice
initiative would appear to be similarly situated. Nonetheless, such determinations are "subject
to considerations of fairness and social policy as well as mere causation." Id. (emphasis
added).
84. Shackil v. Lederle Industries, 561 A.2d 511, 528 (N.J. 1989) (declining to adopt
"market-share" approach in products liability case where tortfeasor could not be identified
with at least a fair degree of probability).
85. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Educ., 493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990) (citing
Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
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another. 6 Moreover, they do not provide much guidance in deciding
under which circumstances specific "religious effects" should be attributed to the state.
In civil rights cases arising under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses, the Court often confronts acts by a state that are
in some way connected with acts by one private citizen resulting in
harm to another private citizen. Although in most such instances the
Court defines the issue as whether the state has acted, the Court
must interpret the state action requirement according to constitutional rationales. Thus, while Establishment Clause cases clearly differ from civil rights cases in that the state has undeniably acted in
Establishment Clause cases, they are not necessarily distinguishable.
In both civil rights and Establishment Clause cases, the Court decides whether the state should be held responsible for the action that
caused the "harm." The origin of principles by which a "constitutional legal cause" theory can be shaped are found in the "state action" doctrine.
A.

A Crucial Symbolic Link: Authority, Policy and State Action

The Court has on occasion decided the issue of causation in
terms of "state action." This has never been moire true than in the
case of Martinez v. California,8 7 a case involving the torture and
murder of a fifteen-year-old girl by a parolee. California had statutorily immunized its public employees from civil liability for injuries
"resulting from determining whether to parole or release a prisoner." 8 8 The decedent's mother filed suit under the Fourteenth
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the State indirectly
caused the decedent's death by enacting the statute condoning the
parole decision and by releasing the parolee. 89
The Court addressed the two State acts separately. The Court
reasoned that enactment of the statute neither authorized nor immunized the killing of any person.9 The parole board's action similarly
did not deprive the decedent of her life without due process of law
because although the decision to release the prisoner was state action, the action of the prisoner five months later could not be charac86. See, e.g., Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. "173 (1985) ("shared-time"
instruction); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (tax credits).
87. 444 U.S. 277, 279 (1980).
88. Id. at 280.
89. Id. at 279.
90. Id. at 281.
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terized as state action."9 1 The court reasoned that:
Regardless of whether, as a matter of state tort law, the parole
board could be said either to have a "duty" to avoid harm to his
victim or to have proximately caused her death . . . we hold

that, taking these particular allegations as true, [the State] did
not "deprive" appellant's decedent of life within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Her life was taken by the parolee
five months after his release. He was in no sense an agent of the
parole board. Further, the parole board was not aware that appellant's decedent, as distinguished
from the public at large,
92
faced any special danger.

In Martinez, the Court adopted its own form of constitutional legal
cause, expressly stating that tort-based causation doctrine is irrelevant, even though the decision is unfortunately barren of whatever
constitutional rationale underlies this intriguing doctrine.
Findings of state action are most often predicated on the
Court's finding that the nexus between state and individual indicates
that state "authority" has been exercised. 93 Beginning with The
Civil Rights Cases in 1883, the Court has invariably held that the
state will be held responsible for wrongs committed with the support
of state authority.9 4 More recently, however, the Court has also
found that state action may exist in the absence of authority when a
state policy is implicated.
For example, a school's discharge policy was not state action
based on its receipt of state funds because its decision to fire the
91. Id. at 285.
92. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980) (emphasis added).
93. See, e.g., Belcher v. Stengel, 429 U.S. 118 (1976) (per curiam) (state held responsible for killings by police officer when officer attempted to make arrest under state authority);
Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 151 (1964) (officer purporting to exercise the authority of a
deputy sheriff).
94. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court discussed the nature of
state action, stating that:
[Clivil rights, such as are guarantied by the constitution against state aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by
state authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such authority, is
simply a private wrong . . . . [A]n invasion of the rights of the injured party, it
is true . . . but if not sanctioned in some way by the state, or not done under
state authority, his rights remain in full force . . . . [The] abrogation and denial
of rights, for which the states alone were or could be responsible, was the great
seminal and fundamental wrong which was intended to be remedied.
Id. at 17-18. Decisions such as Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980), have made it
clear that authority, as described in the foregoing paragraph, is not synonymous with "laws."
Rather, authority may appear "in the shape of" a law. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
at 17.
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plaintiff was not based upon a policy decision of the state.9 5 If implicated by the connection between state and actor, state policy has
been cited by the Court as a sufficient reason for finding state action."' Thus, the Court found state action when California sought to
repeal a law prohibiting private discrimination in rental housing because "[t]he right to discriminate . . . was now embodied in the
State's basic charter .

. . ."

However, there must be more than the mere exercise of state
policy or authority. The actor directly causing the wrong must somehow wield this power.9 8 This actual use requirement may explain

why the Martinez Court found no state action, even conceding that
the state's policy encouraged reckless decisions according to common
law causation principles. It could not be said that the murderer was

clothed with state authority or acted in accordance with the State's
policy.9 9 The policy/authority line of decisions furnishes a principled
means for analyzing state action cases in which a wrong has resulted
indirectly from state action.
Why has the Court consistently upheld the constitutionality of
those acts unsupported by state policy or authority? The Fourteenth
Amendment, through which the Establishment Clause applies to the
states, "preserves an area of individual freedom" by confining the
"reach" of state action. 100 The Bill of Rights, as ;applied to the states
95. Rendall-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1981). Justice Powell, concurring, noted
that "[t]he employment decision remains, therefore, a private deci:sion not fairly attributed to
the State." Id. at 844.
96. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986) (no constitutional cause of action
absent some "rule of conduct or policy put forth by the State"); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S.
153, 156 (1964) ("The State through its regulations has become involved to such a significant
extent in bringing about the discriminatory [effect] that the racial restriction must be held to
reflect the state policy and therefore violate the Fourteenth Amerdment.").
97. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (also holding that those practicing racial
discrimination could invoke express constitutional authority).
98. See, e.g., Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948). Shelly is a landmark case. It
was not a case in which the state merely abstained from action. Instead, the state provided
individuals with "the full coercive power of the government" by enforcing restrictive covenants
discriminating against Blacks. Id. If the Court had undertaken a causation analysis in Shelly,
it might likewise have concluded that the wrongful actors, the White landowners, acted with
state authority.
99. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980). The Court reasoned that the
murderer "was in no sense an agent of the parole board," nor can a "random death" be attributed to state policy. Id.; see also O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 793
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun agreed thai the Due Process Clause is
generally unconcerned with "indirect" injuries, stating that:
I fear, however, that such platitudes often submerge analytical complexities in
particular cases . . . .It seems to me that the indirect character of a harm at
least normally has to do with whether the State action has "deprived" a person
of a protected interest, not with whether a protected interest exists.
Id. (citing Martinez, 444 U.S. 277).
100. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 933, 936 (1982) (holding that private mis-
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through the Fourteenth Amendment, is concerned with state action
when the state action commands illegal ends, 10 1 threatens constitu03
1 2
tional values, 0 or coerces the weak.1
Similar language appears in Establishment Clause cases.10 4 The
provision of government funds directly to sectarian schools is impermissible because it "would have devastating effects upon the right of
each individual voluntarily to determine what to believe (and what
not to believe) free of any coercive pressures of the State."' 0 5 Thus,
in Board of Education v. Mergens,10 the Court observed that a public school which provided a forum for use by religious groups did not
"create any imprimatur of state approval of religious groups of
sects."1 0 7 Justice O'Connor has come closest to adopting the author-

ity/policy rationales through her endorsement test. According to
Justice O'Connor:
Focusing on the evil of government approval or disapproval of
religion makes clear that the effect prong of the Lemon test is
properly interpreted not to require invalidation of a government
practice merely because it in fact causes, even as a primary effect, government advancement or inhibition of religion.' 0 8
Innovative Establishment Clause doctrines naturally arise from cases
involving indirect religious effects.
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test is perhaps the nearest that
any Justice has come to formulating a theory of constitutional legal
cause that takes into account the significance of state action, as limited by the Bill of Rights.'0 9 In Grand Rapids School District v.
Ball, Justice O'Connor distinguished between government speech enuse of state attachment statute against debtor was not "state action").
101. Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144, 192 (1970) (hired policeman denied services of
store to White woman accompanied by Blacks).
102. Rendall-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 849 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103. Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19 (1948).
104. See Lee v. Weisman, 60 U.S.L.W. 4723 (1992). In Weisman, the Court held that,
where "[a] school official, the principal, decided that an invocation and a benediction should
be given [at a high school graduation]; this is a choice attributable to the state ....
Id. at
4728. The Court declined the State's invitation to reconsider Lemon and held that benedictions
at school graduations violate the Establishment Clause because of the "state imposed character of an invocation and benediction by clergy" that left the objecting student "with no alternative but to submit." Id.
105. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985). But see Committee
for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 (1973) (coercion not a
necessary element of claim under the Establishment Clause).
106. 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2371 (1990).

107. Id.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

(5th ed. 1979) defines "imprimatur" as a "license

or allowance" and further defines "authority" as "permission." Id. at 121, 681.
108. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
109. 465 U.S. 668.
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dorsing religion and private speech endorsing religion on the ground
that the former creates a "crucial symbolic link" between government and religion.11 0 In other words, the test is whether government
has legally caused the religious effect.
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test varies from the authority/
policy line of thought discussed above, only in thai Justice O'Connor
would have endorsement determined by the impression of a "reasonable person." Given the broad array of views on the Court, the reasonable person test is unlikely to lead to consistently principled results. It introduces a common law device, fraught with discretionary
opportunities, into a field of law that should ideally be limited to
interpretation grounded in constitutional doctrine.. The endorsement
test might be more accurately applied if either state policy or authority, as defined by the Court's decisions, gives rise to endorsement. A slippery issue, such as School Choice, may be analyzed in a
principled fashion by requiring constitutional legal cause. The concluding section is an example of how this doctrine would work.
B.

The Autonomous Nature of School Choice

According to the plan set forth by Chubb and Moe, a state implementing a School Choice plan would provide funding for education directly to the schools, public and private. 11 '1Decisions as to how
much, if any, funding flows to sectarian schools is, left entirely up to
the parents and students; students are free to attend any school in
the state." 2 Thus, the state is deprived of any mechanisms for directing the flow of money to particular schools.
According to Lemon, the issue is whether the aid to religion is
the primary effect of the School Choice law. Viewed as a matter of
constitutional legal cause, the Court must decide whether the private
decisions of those citizens who spend their vouchers on sectarian
schools (a) reflect state policy; or (b) is an exercise of state authority. This form of analysis brings the issue into much sharper focus.
Logically, neither state policy nor authority can issue from the random, unguided choices of parents scattered across the state. Indeed,
110.

Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985).
CHUBB & MOE, supra note 1, at 219.
112. CHUBB & MOE, supra note I at 219. According to Chtbb and Moe:
[Students] will be free to attend any school in the state, regardless of district,
with the relevant scholarship--consisting of federal, state, and local contributions-flowing to the school of choice. In practice, of course, most students will
probably choose schools in reasonable proximity to their homes. But districts will
have no claims on their own students.
CHUBB & MOE, supra note 1, at 219.
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the market-driven decisions of the masses and the will of the state
appear to stand in contradistinction to one another. "Government, in
the last analysis, is organized opinion." ' 13 School Choice, by contrast, consists of disorganized consumer preferences.
School Choice seems to be the antithesis of government; it is a
decision by the state to permit its citizens to direct their tax dollars
to the school of their choice. It cannot be said that tax dollars flow to
sectarian schools according to state policy or by state authority. Of
course, the state knows that some parents will choose sectarian
schools for their children, and therefore, some would argue that the
state should be held responsible for the natural and probable consequences of its actions." 4 However, this analysis is more akin to tort
or criminal causation doctrines and offers no apparent relation to
what might be called constitutionally-based rationales. 1 It does not
explain why, for example, it is constitutional for the state to pay tax
dollars to government workers, knowing that the workers will transfer some of these dollars to sectarian charities." 6 On the other hand,
if the Court considers the absence of constitutional legal cause, a
decision follows that is principled and faithful to constitutional law.
V.

Conclusion

The Court should expressly analyze School Choice as a question
of constitutional legal cause. It is helpful to remember that the Bill
of Rights is an instrument for governmental restraint. At the most
elemental level, "bills of rights are in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgements of prerogative in favor
' 17
of privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered to the prince."
Although the Bill of Rights may restrict actions by individuals somehow acting in concert with a state, it does not speak to private exer11 8
cises of will.
Finally, one cannot argue in favor of the idea that School
Choice contemplates an exercise of governmental will favoring secta113. WILLIAM L. KING, MESSAGE OF THE CARILLION 233 (1927).
114. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 793
(1973).
115. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
116. Witter v. Washington Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486-87 (1986).
117. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), cited in Smith v. Fair, 363 F.
Supp. 1021, 1023 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
118. See ALEXANDER AND HORTON, supra note 94, at 126. Alexander and Horton, despite an expansive reading of the Bill of Rights, admit that "[t]he idea that private citizens
acting in their private capacities may nonetheless violate the Constitution is 'very difficult to
square with the linguistic formulations' of those amendments providing that "Congress shall
make no law.
... ALEXANDER AND HORTON, supra note 94, at 126.
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rian schools without expanding the concept of government until the
concept loses all meaning. The idea of government is perhaps best
understood by its relation to private citizens. One understanding of
this relationship was recently expressed by the state teachers' union
in Milwaukee, which objected to School Choice because of their concern that private entities would not be accountable to the state.11 9
Bertolt Brecht's lines, penned after the 1953 Berlin uprising, answer
this concern. The East German government had distributed leaflets
chastising the populace for misserving the state, observing that the
people had forfeited the government's trust and could win it back
only by working harder. Brecht wrote:
Wouldn't it
Be simpler if the government
Dissolved the people
and
120
Elected another?
Close scrutiny of issues, divorced from context, can lead to perverse results. For the Court, the peril of analyzing School Choice
without due recognition of constitutional legal cause is that the
Court might find itself holding the state responsible for the choices
of its citizens.

119. David Nicholson, Schools in Transition: Parents and Educators Try Three New
Approaches: Neighborhood Control, a University Affiliation and Parental Choice, WASH.
POST. Aug. 5, 1990, at 17.
120. This poem is entitled "Die Losung," which means either "The Solution" or the
"Dissolution." RONALD HAYMAN, BRECHT: A BIOGRAPHY 422 (1983).

